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Abstract: Except for metaphor, tropes are arguably irrelevant to 
the analysis of science and technology. Among tropes, moreover, 
hyperbole and irony seem particularly ill-suited as the former 
exaggerates, while the latter undermines, two strategies at odds 
with a language intent on closely following the contours of the 
world of experience. While neither hyperbole nor irony has a place 
in the professional discourses of science and technology, both play a 
role, hitherto unnoticed, in their popular representations, 
expressing our complex relationship with the technology that 
surrounds us. Hyperbole expresses our sense that these 
achievements exemplify the sublime, a form of experience applied 
at first to feelings of awe generated by great literature, then in 
succession to natural wonders like the Grand Canyon, triumphs of 
science like Newtonian physics, and triumphs of technology like the 
Large Hadron Collider along with the computers that mediate the 
relationships between the Collider and its scientists and 
technicians. The Collider and its computer-mediated 
communication are unalloyed technological triumphs worthy of 
hyperbole.  They also contain and direct computer mediation 
wholly within our control and wholly supportive of our 
empowerment.  Nonetheless, some of the alterations in social life 
the computer mediates--relationships between us and our fellows-- 
are open to skeptical debate: to a growing sense of 
disempowerment, of a reduction in social capital and cohesion as a 
consequence of a digital revolution that is becoming more and more 
out of our control. Irony is this skepticism’s vehicle.  
Keywords: hyperbole, irony, the sublime, technology, computer-
mediated communication 
Technology and Hyperbole 
In 2008 a rap video by Kate McAlpine went viral. Not your typical 
rap video, it takes place in the tunnel of the Large Hadron Collider 
and on the grounds one hundred feet above. During the 
performance, the computer-generated voice of Stephen Hawking 
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chimes in as part of a periodic call and response.  Throughout, the 
lyrics are replete with technical terms like “protons,” “lead ions,” 
“antimatter,” “black holes,” “dark matter,” “Higgs boson,” 
“Standard Model,” “graviton,” “top quark,” and acronyms like 
“ALICE,” “ATLAS,” and “CMS.” Here is the central refrain, laden 
with hyperbole: 
The LHC accelerates 
the protons and the lead, 
and the things that it discovers 
will rock you in the head.  
The Higgs boson, that's the one 
that everybody talks about, 
and it's the one sure thing 
that this machine will sort out. 
(McAlpine, 2008). 
McAlpine’s was a prophecy that proved on target.  In 2016, Francois 
Englert and Peter Higgs won the Nobel Prize in physics for a 
conjecture that they had made over a half-century earlier, a 
mathematically-driven leap of faith that became a scientific fact 
when the Higgs boson was detected—a hitherto mysterious but 
absolutely central member of the particle zoo.  It was a discovery 
that confirmed the otherwise highly confirmed Standard Model, the 
explanatory centerpiece of the quantum world. At five billion 
dollars, the detector of the Higgs, the Large Hadron Collider, is the 
most expensive scientific apparatus ever built. It is a Mt. Everest of 
machines, and the apotheosis of the technological sublime, a form 
of experience whose origin is a work of literary criticism, Longinus’s 
On the Sublime. Longinus observes that sublimity in poetry or 
prose “consists in a consummate excellence and distinction of 
language.” Such works, he writes, do not “persuade the audience 
but . . . transport them out of themselves,” by drawing their 
attention away “from reasoning to the enthralling effect of the 
imagination” (Longinus, 1995, 163; 225). These works lift their 
readers “near the mighty mind of God” (Longinus, 1995, 277). 
Heights of literary expression like this are achieved in Homer’s 
Iliad. Take this episode translated by Pope—Pope at his iambic 
best—an episode in which the gods intervene in the battle for Troy: 
The mountain shook, the rapid streams stood still: 
Above, the sire of gods his thunder rolls, 
And peals on peals redoubled rend the poles. 
Beneath, stern Neptune shakes the solid ground; 
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The forests wave, the mountains nod around; 
Through all their summits tremble Ida's woods, 
And from their sources boil her hundred floods. 
Troy's turrets totter on the rocking plain; 
And the toss'd navies beat the heaving main. 
Deep in the dismal regions of the dead, 
Th' infernal monarch rear'd his horrid head, 
Leap'd from his throne, lest Neptune's arm should lay 
His dark dominions open to the day, 
And pour in light on Pluto's drear abodes, 
Abhorr'd by men, and dreadful ev'n to gods  
(Homer, 1887, 433). 
In this passage, Homer’s lofty language is combined with a 
conceptual grandeur: “The earth,” Longinus asserts, “is split to its 
foundations, hell itself laid bare, the whole universe sundered and 
turned upside down; and meanwhile everything, heaven and hell, 
mortal and immoral alike, shares in the conflict and dangers of that 
battle” (Longinus, 1995, 147).   
Although turned into English as early as 1652, it is not until 
1704, in John Dennis’s The Grounds of Criticism in Poetry, that On 
The Sublime finds its way into English literary criticism. Dennis 
defines the sublime as “nothing else but a great thought, or great 
thoughts moving the soul from its ordinary situation by the 
enthusiasm that naturally attends them” (Ashfield and de Bolla, 
1996, 37):  
For the spirits being set in a violent emotion, and the 
imagination being fired by that agitation; and the brain 
being deeply penetrated by those impressions, the very 
objects themselves are set as it were before us, and 
consequently we are sensible of the same passion that we 
should feel from the things themselves. For the warmer 
the imagination is, the less able we are to reflect, and 
consequently the things are the more present to us of 
which we draw the images; and therefore where the 
imagination is so inflamed as to render the soul utterly 
incapable of reflecting, there is no difference between 
the images and the things themselves (Ashfield and de 
Bolla, 1996, 39). 
It is in Addison and Steele’s Spectator that we first come upon the 
natural sublime. It is impossible to overestimate the importance 
and popularity of this periodical. Addison’s estimate of 60,000 
readers is not an exaggeration (Cowan, 2004).  Trivial today, this 
figure represents ten per cent of the population of 18th century 
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London, the equivalent of a YouTube video gone viral (Wrigley, 
1967).  Moreover, the 18th century saw an astonishing fifteen 
editions or reprints of the collected essays. There were also 
translations into French and German. Other works promoting the 
natural sublime were also popular: Hugh Blair and Lord Kames 
went into seven editions and Edmund Burke into six. Burke was 
translated into French and into German. In the last decade of the 
century, Lord Kames was translated into German and reprinted in 
America. The natural sublime was on a roll.  
What is the natural sublime? To Addison, “When we look on 
such hideous objects [as a precipice at a distance], we are not a little 
pleased to think we are in no danger of them. We consider them, at 
the same time, as dreadful and harmless; so that the more frightful 
appearance they make, the greater is the pleasure we receive from 
the sense of our own safety” (Addison, 1898, 6, 109).  So long as we 
are safe, a storm fills us with an “agreeable horror” (Addison, 1898, 
7, 75-76).  Burke deepens Addison’s analysis.  He feels that pain and 
terror are the only sources of the sublime, pain and terror 
transformed—pain not painful and terror not terrifying— and both 
evoking a positive emotion akin to pleasure. Burke calls it delight:  
If the pain and terror are so modified as not to be 
actually noxious; If the pain is not carried to violence, 
and the terror is not conversant about the present 
destruction of the person, as these emotions clear the 
parts, whether fine or gross, of a dangerous and 
troublesome encumbrance, they are capable of 
producing delight; not pleasure, but a sort of delightful 
horror, a sort of tranquility tinged with terror; which, as 
it belongs to self-preservation, is one of the strongest of 
all the passions. Its object is the sublime. Its highest 
degree I call astonishment; the subordinate degrees are 
awe, reverence, and respect, which, by the very 
etymology of the words, show from what source they are 
derived, and how they stand distinguished from positive 
pleasure (Burke, 1889, 10). 
To Burke, astonishment is a psychological state in which the mind 
is so filled with a sublime object that it can, while the experience 
lasts, entertain no other thought or image. The eruption of Vesuvius 
or a stormy coast in Brittany possess “the great power of the 
sublime, that, far from being produced by them, it anticipates our 
reasonings, and hurries us on by an irresistible force” (Burke, 1889, 
40).  
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On the continent, Immanuel Kant synthesizes, analyzes, and 
deepens even more the idea of the natural sublime. For Kant, the 
sublime is an effect of the vastness and the power of nature. It is 
through its vastness that we experience the first category of the 
sublime, the mathematical. The immensity of the cosmos 
overwhelms us; it exceeds the capacity of our imagination. Despite 
our best efforts, we fail to grasp what our reason tells us must be 
the case: 
A tree that we estimate by a man’s height will do as a 
standard for [estimating the height of] a mountain. If the 
mountain were to be about a mile high, it can serve as 
the unity for the number that expresses the earth’s 
diameter and so make that diameter intuitable. The 
earth’s diameter can serve similarly for estimating the 
planetary system familiar to us, and that [in turn] for 
estimating the Milky Way system. And the immense 
multitude of such Milky Way systems, called nebulous 
stars, which presumably form another such system 
among themselves, do not lead us to expect any 
boundaries here. Now when we judge such an immense 
whole aesthetically, the sublime lies not so much in the 
magnitude of the number as in the fact that, the farther 
we progress, the larger are the unities we reach. This is 
partly due to the systematic division in the structure of 
the world edifice; for this division always presents to us 
whatever is large in nature as being small in turn, though 
what it actually presents to us is our imagination, in all 
its boundlessness, and along with it nature as 
vanishing[ly] small], in contrast to the ideas of reason, if 
the imagination is to provide an exhibition adequate to 
them (Kant, 1987, SS26). 
In Kant’s second category, the dynamic sublime, our imagination is 
overwhelmed by nature’s power:  
Bold, overhanging, and, as it were, threatening rocks, 
thunderclouds piling up in the sky, and moving about 
accompanied by lightning and thunderclaps, volcanoes 
with all their destructive power, hurricanes with all the 
devastation they leave, the boundless ocean heaved up, 
the high waterfall of a mighty river, and so on. 
Compared to the might of any of these, our ability to 
resist becomes an insignificant trifle” (Kant, 1987, 
SS28).  
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It is a power that, if we are to experience it as sublime, must not 
have any actual power over us, lest we feel, not pleasurable 
agitation, but real fear.  
Because the sublime first manifests itself as “violent to our 
imagination” (Kant, 1987, SS23), our moral sense must transform it 
into something more manageable. By placing us in contact with the 
Deity, this sense transcends any inadequacy we may feel in 
consequence of the sublime’s emotional buffeting.  It is our insight 
into the kinship between sublimity and Deity that is a source of the 
pleasure we experience: 
Hence sublimity is contained not in any thing of nature, 
but only in our mind, in so far as we can become 
conscious of our superiority to nature within us, and 
thereby also to nature outside us (as far as it influences 
us). Whatever arouses this feeling within us, and this 
includes the might of nature that challenges our forces, 
is then (although improperly) called sublime. And it is 
only by presupposing this idea within us, and by 
referring to it, that we arrive at the idea of the sublimity 
of that being who arouses deep respect in us, not just by 
his might, as demonstrated in nature, but even more by 
the ability, with which we have been endowed, to judge 
nature without fear and to think of our vocation as being 
sublimely above nature (Kant, 1987, SS28). 
This experience must be free from any inference concerning the 
character of the natural objects and events we view:  
When we call the sight of the starry sky sublime, we 
must not base our judgment upon any concepts of 
worlds inhabited by rational beings, and then [conceive 
of] bright dots that we see occupying the space above us 
as being  these worlds’ suns, moved in orbits prescribed 
for them with great purposiveness; but we must base our 
judgment regarding it merely on how we see it, as a vast 
vault encompassing everything, and merely under this 
presentation may we posit the sublimity that a pure 
aesthetic judgment attributes to this object” (Kant, 1987, 
SS29).  
For Kant, there is no category reserved for the scientific sublime. 
It is not to Kant but to the British and Scottish schools, and 
especially to Adam Smith, that we owe the extension of the sublime 
from nature and art to science.  It is Smith who provides us with the 
first satisfactory analysis of the psychology of the scientific sublime.  
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To him, a path to the sublime opens when a spectacular natural 
event—an eclipse of the sun for example—captures our attention 
and causes:  
the imagination and memory [to] exert themselves to no 
purpose, and in vain look around all their classes of 
ideas in order to find one under which it may be 
arranged. They fluctuate to no purpose from thought to 
thought, and we remain still uncertain and 
undetermined where to place it, or what to think of it. It 
is this fluctuation and vain recollection, together with 
the emotion or movement of the spirits that they excite, 
which constitute the sentiment properly called Wonder, 
and which occasions that staring, and sometimes that 
rolling of the eyes, that suspension of the breath, and 
that swelling of the heart, which we may all observe, 
both in ourselves and others, when wondering at some 
new object, and which are the natural symptoms of 
uncertain and undetermined thought. What sort of a 
thing can that be? What is that like? are the questions 
which, upon such an occasion, we are all naturally 
disposed to ask (Smith, 1982, 39). 
It is in Newton’s Principia, according to Smith, that this wonder 
culminates: 
Can we wonder then, that it should have gained the 
general and complete approbation of mankind, and that 
it should now be considered, not as an attempt to 
connect in the imagination the phenomena of the 
Heavens, but as the greatest discovery that ever was 
made by man, the discovery of an immense chain of the 
most important and sublime truths, all closely connected 
together, by one capital fact, [gravity], of the reality of 
which we have daily experience (Smith, 1982, 105). 
C. P. Snow gives us a more contemporary example—the second law 
of thermodynamics, the principle that all closed systems eventually 
run down: “It has its own somber beauty; like all major scientific 
laws, it evokes reverence” (Snow, 1998, 72).  
The 19th century ushers in the technological sublime.  To 
historian David Nye, we experience this sublime when we meet a 
startling man-made object like the Hoover Dam, an encounter that 
“disrupts ordinary perception and astonishes the senses, forcing the 
observer to grapple mentally with its immensity and power” (Nye, 
1994, 15).  Nye’s examples are drawn from American technology: 
the transcontinental railroad, the Erie Canal, atomic bomb, the 
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Apollo spacecraft, and the Brooklyn Bridge.  Of the Brooklyn 
Bridge, Nye notes the many artistic renderings of its “monumental 
stone piers and ethereal spun-steel cables” and quotes one of the 
most famous painters of this sublime architecture, Joseph Stella: 
“Many nights… I stood on the bridge… I felt deeply moved, as if on 
the threshold of a new religion or in the presence of a new 
DIVINITY” (Nye, 1994, 85). To Nye:  
The sublime taps into fundamental hopes and fears. It is 
not a social residue, created by economic and political 
forces, though both can inflect its meaning. Rather, it is 
an essentially religious feeling, aroused by the 
confrontation with impressive objects, such as Niagara 
Falls, the Grand Canyon, the New York skyline, the 
Golden Gate Bridge, or the earth-shaking launch of a 
space shuttle. The technological sublime is an integral 
part of contemporary consciousness, and its emergence 
and exfoliation into several distinct forms during the 
past [three] centuries is inscribed within public life. In a 
physical world that is increasingly desacralized, the 
sublime represents a way to reinvest the landscape and 
the works of men with transcendental significance (Nye, 
1994, xiii).  
The Large Hadron Collider 
To describe the Large Hadron Collider, an apotheosis of the 
technological sublime, theoretical physicist and popular science 
writer Lisa Randall employs the vocabulary of hyperbole.  Of her 
first visit, she says: “I was surprised at the sense of awe it inspired—
this in spite of my having visited particle colliders and detectors 
many times before.  Its scale was simply different. …The 
complexity, coherence, and magnitude, as well as the crisscrossing 
lines and colors, are hard to convey in words. The impression is awe 
inspiring” (Randall, 2006, 127-28). The LHC is “the most important 
experimental machine for particle physicists” (Randall, 2006, 143). 
Concerning its properties, there is no need to exaggerate: 
description is hyperbole enough. The LHC has a long list of 
arresting characteristics. The first is the triumph over time. The 
Collider will be able to simulate events that occurred in the “first 
trillionth of a millisecond after the Big Bang” (Randall, 2006, 129). 
The second is the triumph over space, the investigation of the 
tiniest components of the universe: “incredibly small sizes—on the 
order of a tenth of a thousandth of a trillionth of a millimeter . . . a 
factor of ten smaller in size than anything any experiment has ever 
looked at before” (Randall, 2006, 218).  Other superlatives concern 
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energy: “up to seven times the energy of the highest existing 
collider”; temperature: “even colder than outer space”; magnetic 
field: “100,000 times stronger than the Earth’s”; and cost: “the 
most expensive machine ever built” ($5 billion, with operating costs 
of one billion a year). At $350 million in today’s dollars the 
Brooklyn Bridge was a bargain. 
The story of the Higgs discovery is told in the documentary film, 
Particle Fever, the joint effort of director Mark Levinson, who holds 
a Ph.D. in physics, and Walter Murch, the winner of two Oscars as a 
film editor. A masterpiece of editing, Particle Fever begins with 
cows munching grass in a Swiss meadow just outside Geneva. In 
the near distance, in the midst of this bucolic tranquility, we see 
CERN, the Conseil Européen pour la Recherche Nucléaire, the 
location of the Large Hadron Collider, a machine in a garden, in the 
incisive formulation of Lewis Mumford. We see experimental 
physics post-doc Monica Dunford on her way to the Collider, 
cycling past Route Marie Curie and Route R. Feynman. She is an 
instant starlet who characterizes the Collider in such hyperbole as 
“a five-story Swiss watch,” one that will when the Higgs experiment 
is carried out create a child’s sense of excitement at a forthcoming 
birthday party where “there’s goin’ to be cake.”  
Upon their collision in the Large Hadron Collider, protons 
convert into other forms of matter or into energy.  In computer-
mediated conversation with the Collider, scientists monitor the 
decay products from which the existence of the Higgs boson, the 
signature of the Higgs field, is inferred. The result turns out to be 
ambiguous; it points in no definite theoretical direction. While the 
discovery supports the Standard Model, the new particle is too light 
to point definitively in the direction of a multiverse, a theory in 
which our universe is one of many, perhaps even infinitely many, 
and a too heavy to point into the direction of super-symmetry, an 
upgrade of the Standard Model.  Still, there is little doubt that this 
discovery is the capstone of the  
extraordinary era in which we live. It is altogether new. 
The world has seen nothing like it before. I will not 
pretend, no one can pretend, to discern the end; but 
everybody knows that the age is remarkable for scientific 
research into the heavens, the earth, and what it beneath 
the earth…  The ancients saw nothing like it. The 
moderns have seen nothing like it till the present 
generation.  
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It is not Peter Higgs speaking or Monica Dunford or Lisa Randall. It 
is Daniel Webster; the date is August 28, 1847, the day the 
Northern Railroad opened (Marx, 1964, 214). 
Technology and Irony 
Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson interpret “all examples of irony . . . 
as echoic mentions,” that is, words not employed in one of their 
ordinary senses, but instead singled out for interpretation (Sperber 
and Wilson, 1991, 558).  Sperber and Wilson have a second 
criterion: their “analysis of irony as a case of echoic mention 
crucially involves the evocation of an attitude—that of the speaker 
to the proposition mentioned,” an attitude that is always negative 
(Sperber and Wilson, 1991, 562). Alan Partington, another theorist, 
propounds a bi-sociative theory in which the ironist tells two stories 
at the same time, one straightforward, the other, skeptical of the 
first, an epistemological Möbius strip (Partington, 2007).  It is an 
irony that is not always, but almost always negative.  An exchange 
from Pride and Prejudice between Mr. Darcy and Elizabeth Bennett 
conforms to both these theories: 
“You take an eager interest in that gentleman’s 
concerns,” said Darcy in a less tranquil tone, and with a 
heightened color. 
“Who that knows what his misfortunes have been, can 
help feeling an interest in him?”  
“His misfortunes,” repeated Darcy contemptuously, “yes, 
his misfortunes have been great indeed” (Austen, 1813, 
198). 
There are two Partington stories here.  Elizabeth’s naïve fiction and 
Darcy’s devastating fact, his knowledge of Wickham’s turpitude.  
Echo theory also explains the irony: Darcy’s “his misfortunes” is 
clearly an echo, whose irony is signaled by the adverb 
“contemptuously” and the intensive “indeed.” The novel’s title is 
right on target.  Elizabeth’s prejudice—and her pride in her 
mistaken judgment of Wickham and Darcy’s character—are 
evident. Darcy’s pride and prejudice are also evident in his 
contempt for Elizabeth’s opinion, his lack of understanding and 
sympathy for her sincere though misplaced compassion. Over the 
course of the novel, their pride and prejudice will entrap both in a 
complex reticulation of ironies that conforms to Quintilian’s 
observation: while the trope irony applies to isolated instances, its 
figure applies to whole paragraphs, even to whole works 
(Quintillian, 95 C. E., 9.2.44-46). 
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 How does figural irony manifest itself in popular discourse on 
the technological sublime? In the popular science writer James 
Gleick’s essay, “Multiple Personality Disorder,” figural irony is 
triggered by a coordinated set of departures from standard prose, 
not in themselves necessarily ironic (Glieck, 1999). These 
expressions are italicized:  
Rob Kling, professor of information science at Indiana 
University introduced a special issue of the journal 
Information Society this summer with a canonical 
version of anonymity’s “double-edged” character: on the 
one hand, a fanatic signing e-mail as Asian Hater 
spreads fear at the University of California by 
threatening to hunt down and kill fellow students; on the 
other hand, human rights activists use anonymous.com 
to protect Kosovars trying to send out reports on the 
Balkan war.  
We understand the dilemma. On the one hand, freedom 
from persecution and embarrassment, on the other, a 
mask for criminal and antisocial behavior. On the one 
hand, the Lone Ranger; on the other hand, the Ku Klux 
Klan.  On the one hand, hoaxes, libel, and fraud. On the 
other hand… free speech? 
But free speech never used to mean nameless speech. It 
has not, until now, entailed the power to broadcast 
anonymously to millions of listeners. Creating protection 
for unpopular expression was important, and expensive, 
precisely because everyone knew who those unpopular 
speakers were. In the ancient small world we know 
from history books and black-and-white movies—when 
people stayed in more or less the same place and 
encountered pretty much the same dramatis personae 
year after year—a person’s name mattered. If someone’s 
character was tarred or besmirched, the damage wasn’t 
easily undone. Reputation stayed with you (Glieck, 
2002, 253). 
A network of tropical ironies inhabits these paragraphs, ironies 
indicated variously by quotation marks (“double-edged” is not a 
quotation), ellipsis, italics, and a question mark. The phrase “free 
speech” is introduced by ellipsis indicating hesitation; its ironic 
twist is created by the question mark and by its later echo, 
“nameless speech.”  
Tropic ironies inhabit but do not constitute the net. Framing 
this passage is a contrast between the world before and after 
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computer-mediated communication, a contrast created by a series 
of references that turn a relatively recent into an apparently ancient 
past, its people reduced from real to fictional, to “dramatis 
personae.” While this contrast between worlds is not in itself ironic, 
it is evoked with ironic intent. It is this contrast that gives the last 
sentence an ironic twist: computer-mediated communication has 
undermined trust, the keystone in the social fabric whose chief 
vehicle is face-to-face communication.  
Opinion is divided as to the justice of this skepticism. Writing in 
2000, before the impact of the computer-mediated communication 
could be reliably assessed, Robert Putnam amply documents the 
diminution of social capital:  
Over the last three decades a variety of social, economic, 
and technological changes have rendered obsolete a 
significant stock of America’s social capital. … Our 
growing social-capital deficit threatens educational 
performance, safe neighborhoods, equitable tax 
collection, democratic responsiveness, everyday honesty, 
and even our health and happiness” (Putnam, 2000, 
367).   
Steeply down are such activities as card-playing, entertaining 
friends at home, and visiting friends or family who do not live 
nearby, activities that lead to the accumulation of social capital. As 
we move forward from generation to generation, moreover, fewer 
and fewer people believe that most of their fellow citizens can be 
trusted, fewer work on community projects, and fewer attend 
church or clubs regularly. Since the accumulation of social capital 
correlates highly with social benefits— “where children flourish, 
where babies are born healthy, where teenagers tend not to become 
parents, drop out of school, get involved with violent crime, or die 
prematurely due to suicide or homicide” —these losses are both real 
and impressive (Putnam, 2000, 296). Writing six years later, as the 
effect of the internet was beginning to be felt, McPherson, Smith-
Lovin and Brashears agree with Putnam’s estimate (McPherson et 
al., 2006). 
Still, the matter cannot rest here.  Relying on the same data, 
Marsden feels that “declines in some forms of social connectivity 
are evident, but these are neither universal nor dramatic” 
(Marsden, 2012, 13).  Employing a different data set and a different 
set of questions, Hampton, Sessions, and Her find that since 1985 
social isolation has not increased (Hampton et al., 2010).  Paik and 
Sanchagrin and Fischer raise a serious methodological question; 
they argue that the declines that Putnam and McPherson et al. 
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observed might well have been an artifact of faulty interview 
techniques (Paik and Sanchagrin, 2013; Fischer, 2005, 2009).  
Furthermore, Putnam himself is hardly pessimistic about the 
impact of computer-mediated communication; on the contrary, he 
feels that “the early evidence . . . strongly suggests that computer-
mediated communication will turn out to complement, not replace, 
face-to-face communication” (Putnam, 2000, 379; his emphasis).  
As internet usage has grown, this conviction seems to have been 
borne out (Amichai-Hamburger and Hayat, 2010; Hampton et al. 
2010; Arampatz, Burger, and Novik 2016.  Between 1999 and 2017, 
internet users in the developed world rose from 24 to 78 per 
hundred, while four billion world-wide were reached, their number 
having doubled twice since 2005 (Global Internet Usage).  Smart 
phone usage has also increased in the US from 35 per hundred in 
2011 to 77 in 2017 (Mobile Fact Sheet).  
In Networked, Rainee and Wellman imitate Lisa Randall. The 
mere recital of the facts is hyperbolic, an instance of the digital 
sublime: the size of people’s discussion networks—those with whom 
they discuss important matters—is 12 per cent larger among mobile 
phone users, 9 per cent larger for individuals who share photos 
online, and 9 per cent bigger for those who use instant messaging. 
The diversity of people’s core networks—their closest and most 
significant confidants—tends to be 25 per cent larger for mobile 
phone users, 15 per cent larger for occasional internet users, and 
even larger for frequent internet users (Rainee and Wellman, 2012, 
119). 
However heartening, these results do not address Gleick’s 
concern that computer-mediated communication, however wide-
ranging, is altering for the worse who we are and how we relate to 
others.  In Reclaiming Conversation: The Power of Talk in a 
Digital Age, Sherry Turkle makes the essential point: “Without 
conversation, studies show that we are less empathic, less 
connected, less creative and fulfilled. We are diminished, in retreat. 
But in generations that used their phones to text and message, these 
studies may be describing losses they don’t feel” (Turkle, 2016, 13; 
her emphasis).  Asked what’s wrong with conversation, one of her 
respondents replies: “What’s wrong with conversation? I’ll tell you 
what’s wrong with conversation! It takes place in real time and you 
can’t control what you’re going to say” (Turkle, 2016, 22).  
It is Professor of Communication Gary C. Woodward who tells 
us what’s wrong with computer-mediated communication: 
When two or more people are in the same space 
addressing each other, their exchanges are likely to 
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contain all of the critical yardsticks for measuring 
successful interaction. These essential processes include 
awareness of the other, the potential for immediate and 
unfiltered reciprocity in an exchange, and access to all 
the visual and verbal feedback that comes with direct 
person-to-person contact. All other channels of 
communication— including the devices that extend the 
range of human connectivity— alter or diminish one or 
more of one of these processes (Woodward, 2017, 146). 
This is an absence that can have dire consequences. In medicine, 
for example, patients are becoming I-Patients: 
The problem with this chart, as surrogate-for-the-
patient approach is— to quote Alfred Korzybski, the 
father of general semantics— that the map is not the 
territory. If one eschews the skilled and repeated 
examination of the real patient, then simple diagnoses 
and new developments are overlooked, while tests, 
consultations, and procedures that might not be needed 
are ordered (Verghese, 2008, 2748). 
In one study, when a physical examination supplemented the patient 
chart, conditions were discovered that required treatment in over one 
in four inpatients (Reilly, 2003).   
The multi-tasking that computer-mediated communication 
encourages also leads to the erosion of a precious communicative 
resource—someone else’s attention. According to one survey, 
during conference calls 63% of participants were sending emails, 
47% were going to the restroom, and 21% were engaged in online 
shopping (Gavitt, 2014).  In America 20% of 18 to 34 year olds 
answered their mobile phones during sex (Sherman, 2013); in Great 
Britain, the figure rose to one in four (Birch, 2011).  
For sociologist George Herbert Mead, such erosion has serious 
consequences because “we must be others if we are to be ourselves” 
(Mead, 1964, 292).  A process beginning at birth and extending over 
time to all our social contacts creates a “generalized other:”  
The child must not only take the role of the other, as he 
does in . . . play, but he must assume the various roles of 
all the participants in the game, and govern his action 
accordingly. If he plays first base, it is as the one to 
whom the ball will be thrown from the field or from the 
catcher. Their organized reactions to him he has 
embedded in his own playing of the different positions 
and this organized reaction becomes what I have called 
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the “generalized other” that accompanies and controls 
his conduct. And it is this generalized other in his 
experience that provides him with a self (Mead, 1964, 
285). 
To Mead, face-to-face communication is essential to this process, 
the source, equally, of the socialization of the individual and the 
continuing health of society: “It has been the vocal gesture,” he 
says, “that has preeminently provided the medium of social 
organization in human society” (Mead, 1964, 287).  
Martin Buber’s Ich und Du adds an existential dimension to 
Mead’s sociology (Buber, 1995, Eng. trans. 1970). The choice of du 
is the foundation of a philosophy of human interaction. While Ich is 
I, Du is not Thou, its usual translation; rather, it is the you of 
intimate relationships, a word for which there is no equivalent in 
everyday English.  Buber’s choice of du reflects his insistence that 
even in routine interactions between persons and things, there 
exists the possibility of the utmost intimacy, a relation between one 
essential self and another.  
To this set, there must be added a third member: the es, the it 
that designates “an object of detached perception and experience,” 
that is, any object or person, treated as a means rather than an end 
(Buber, 1970).  Most of our relationships are of this order. But not 
all: one du can encounter another in dialogue, both having been 
shaped by dialogue, Buber’s term for any means of communication, 
tactile or verbal. The other need not be a human being. In the child, 
“little inarticulate sounds still ring out senselessly and persistently 
into nothing; but one day they will have turned imperceptibly into a 
conversation [Gespräch] —with what?  Perhaps with a bubbling tea 
kettle, but into a conversation” (Buber, 1970, 78).  It is through this 
“conversation”—du with du—that we become an ich, a person in our 
own right, a member of a community (Buber, 1970, 80).  
Writing in the Europe of 1923, Buber feels that there is no such 
community, that the state and the business-industrial complex 
routinely treat human beings  
not as carriers of an inexperienceable du but rather as 
centers of services and aspirations that have to be 
calculated and employed according to their specific 
capacities. Wouldn’t their world come crashing down 
upon them if they refused to add up He + He + He to get 
an es, and tried instead to determine the sum of du and 
du and du, which can never be anything else than du? 
(Buber 1970, 96).  
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Buber feels “that modern developments have expunged almost 
every trace of a life in which human beings confront each other and 
have meaningful relationships.” There is, he fears, “nothing to be 
inherited but the despotism of the proliferating es under which the 
ich, more and more impotent, is still dreaming that it is in 
command” (Buber, 1970, 97).  In these circumstances, the ich is 
“reduced from substantial fullness to a functional [point] of a 
subject that experiences and uses objects” rather than 
“confront[ing] them in the current of reciprocity” (Buber, 1970, 80).  
In effect, Mead’s generalized other has shrunk from a du to an es, a 
node in a network of contending forces in which  
by far the greater part of what is called conversation 
among men would be more properly and precisely 
described as speechifying. In general, people do not 
really speak to one another, but each, although turned 
to the other, really speaks to a fictitious court of 
appeal where life consists of nothing but listening to 
him (Buber, 1996, 78– 79). 
Buber is criticizing a Europe poised entre deux guerres, a 
decade away from disaster; he is also criticizing crucial aspects 
of a world he did not live to experience. 
Conclusion 
I have treated hyperbole as a means of conveying a celebratory 
attitude toward the Large Hadron Collider and its computer-
mediated communication, irony as means of conveying a skeptical 
attitude toward an analogous computer-mediated communication, 
a technology that intervenes between us and our fellows. 
Throughout the history of rhetoric, the technical aspect has been 
the standard approach to such tropes: they are viewed solely as 
devices of style.  But we can see from the analysis of their use in 
popular works centering on technology that more is at stake. There 
is no question that such technologies as computer-mediated 
communication increase what we can accomplish, that they 
empower us as in the case of the Large Hadron Collider, and clearly 
hyperbole is the master trope designed to celebrate such an 
achievement.  But without another master trope as its steady 
companion, without irony, hyperbole distorts the complexity of our 
experience; without irony, we miss a looming disempowerment, the 
loss in social capital and cohesion that computer-mediated 
communication also entails, our sense that in human relationships 
it is technology that is in the driver’s seat. We see no need to repair 
the damage incurred by the erosion of face-to-face communication; 
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we do not recognize that both hyperbole and irony evoke an 
existential dimension with which it is a mistake not to reckon. 
Copyright © 2018 Alan Gross 
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